I. RELATIONSHIP AMONG VARIANCE, AMPLITUDE AND GROUP SIZE
For a multiple-resource MG system of N agents, as is shown in the main article, the available strategies can be divided into pairs of groups. In particular, as shown in the schematic map Fig. 5 in the main article, for the strategy in group g 1 denoted by s i , and the strategy in group g 2 denoted by s j , if the number of agents n s i (t) < N/k < n s j (t), we will have n s i (t + 1) > N/k > n s j (t + 1).
Additionally, the average numbers of agents for strategies s i and s j are not equal to N/k. For n s i > N/k, and n s j < N/k, we define,
with ∆n sx the absolute value of the difference between n sx and N/k. Assuming the MG system is closed so that the number of agents is a constant, we have
Thus, for two consecutive time steps, we have,
Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (3), we have
from which we obtain the relations between A s i and A s j , ∆n s i and ∆n s j as
We see that the fluctuations of the time series are closely related the grouping of the strategies.
From the definition of σ 2 s , we can write the variances of n s i and n s j as
Using Eq. (4), we obtain
Fig. 2 in the main article shows that the ratio of the variances of group g 1 and g 2 from the simulation agree very well with Eq. (5).
II. MEAN-FIELD THEORY
We develop a mean-field theory to understand the fluctuation patterns of the system. To be concrete, we still treat the case of two distinct groups. Consider strategy s i that belongs to group g 1 and assume that s i is the majority strategy at time t = t 0 , i.e., n
s i > N/k. According to the mean-field approximation, at the next time step t = t 0 + 1, the number of agents n (1)
where
Here, w 1 and w 2 together are the number of agents abandoning strategy s i (or the flow out of
s i agents, w 1 agents will act based on local information by selecting a minority strategy different than s i for the next time step t 0 + 1. At the same time, there will be w 2 agents acting without local information by choosing randomly one of the other k − 1 strategies.
The quantity w 3 represents the flow into s i from the remaining N − n (0) s i agents. These agents will mutate randomly to switch their strategies to s i without any local information. We thus have
(1)
Then s i and the other k g 1 − 1 strategies in g 1 are the minority strategy, and the agents selecting those strategies win the game at t = t 0 + 1. The time series n (2) s i at time t 0 + 2 can be written as
where w 4 and w 5 stand for the flows out of strategy s i , while w 6 and w 7 represent the flows into s i
s i agents on other strategies. We have
where n
s i is larger than N/k, s i and all other strategies in group g 1 will be the majority strategy again, as at time t 0 . The process n s i → n (1)
s i thus occurs iteratively. From Eqs. (8) and (10), we can get the number of agents for one given strategy at any time t. In particular, denoting
, we obtain the iterative dynamics for agents selecting strategy s i as
where a ∈ R and n (t ) s i stands for the number of agents at t = t 0 + t . Carrying out the iterative process in Eq. (11), we obtain
For the case where n s (t) exhibits stable oscillations, i.e., the system is in a stationary state, we have,
We thus obtain the values of n
as a function of the probability p, mutation probability m, and the grouping parameter k g 1 , and k:
From n s , we can get the expression of the amplitude of the fluctuation, the mean value n s i , and its difference from N/k as,
,
In the above derivation, we have assumed that s i belongs to group g 1 , and obtained expressions of the n s i , A s i , n s i , and ∆n s i . Similarly, using Eq. (2), we can calculate the time series n s j , the number of agents selecting the strategy s j belonging to group g 2 , and the corresponding characterizing quantities.
Alternatively, following the steps similar to those from Eqs. (6) to (11), we can write the recurrence formula for n s j as
where γ g 2 = N p/k g 2 . For the case of stable strategy, we get the corresponding number of agents
We find that the values of n s obtained from Eq. (13) agree with those from Eq. (2) very well (derivation and data not shown). In addition, the expressions of A s j , n s j , and ∆n s j are identical to those associated with s i , with the quantity γ g 1 replaced by γ g 2 .
As shown in Fig. 6 in the main article, the results from the mean-field theory, Eqs. (12)(13), and the direct simulations on fully connected networks agree with each other very well.
III. MEAN-FIELD THEORY FOR MG DYNAMICS ON SPARSELY HOMOGENEOUS NET-

WORKS
In real-world situations, a fully connected topology cannot be expected, and the mean-field treatment will no longer be accurate. Here, we develop a modified mean-field analysis for MG dynamics on sparsely homogeneous networks (e.g., square lattices or random networks).
Due to the limited number of links in a typical large-scale network, it is possible for a failed agent to be surrounded by agents from the same group (who will likewise fail the game). In this case, the failed agent has no minority strategy to imitate (set Π is empty) and thus will randomly select one strategy from the k available strategies. Taking this effect into account, we can modify the mean-field approximation in Eqs. (6) and (9) as
with the two modified terms given by
where η gx is the probability for one agent in group g x to be surrounded by agents from the same group. The quantity w 8 stands for the flow from the failed agents in group g 1 [the number is
s i ], who react to the information [the number is N g 1 p] but with no winner surrounded to supply the optional minority strategy [the number is N g 1 pη g ], and thus select s i with probability 1/k. The quantity w 9 represent two factors: (1) the n 1 = (N − k g 1 n (1)
η g 2 failed agents in group g 2 who should have flow into s i [i.e. w 6 ] but are held back because they are surrounded by agents in g 2 , and (2) the failed agents in group g 2 who are surrounded by agents in g 2 and thus select s i with 1/k probability, the number of which is n 2 = (N − k g 1 n (1)
. Apparently, we have w 9 = n 2 − n 1 . From Eq. (14), we obtain
and,
where the parameters are
The equation set (15) represents the modified mean-field description of the time series associated with the stable strategies in the game system supported on sparsely homogeneous networks. The density of agents in g x is denoted by ρ gx ≡ N gx /N . For the case where agents from different groups are well mixed in the network, the probability for one given agent in g x to meet with agents in g y is P gxgy = ρ gy (for x, y = 1, 2). If the average degree of the network is d, the probability that one agent from g x is surrounded by agents from the same group is η gx = (P gxgx ) 
